Insights

Brussels – May 22, 2024: Senior antitrust regulators from the European Commission, the U.K.’s Competition and Markets Authority, and the U.S. Department of Justice will join industry and academic leaders for in-depth discussions at the Crowell & Moring and King's College London Sixth Annual EU Competition Law Conference on June 11 at TheMerode in Brussels.

Washington – February 22, 2019: Crowell & Moring LLP’s Antitrust Group has again been recognized as “Highly Recommended” in Global Competition Review’s (GCR) 19th edition of the “GCR 100” – the leading ranking of the world’s competition policy law and economics practices. This marks the fourth year in a row in which the firm was ranked as “Highly Recommended” in Washington, D.C. and New York. Additionally, the group was ranked as “Recommended” in California. GCR is the leading international journal of competition policy and regulation.

On March 18, President Trump fired the Federal Trade Commission’s two Democratic Commissioners, Alvaro Bedoya and Rebecca Kelly Slaughter. The move represents the latest effort by the Trump administration to exert greater control over executive-branch agencies, including bi-partisan independent agencies like the FTC.

On February 18, President Trump issued an Executive Order titled “Ensuring Accountability for All Agencies” that directs independent agencies (as well as Cabinet Departments and their sub-agencies) to route all “proposed and final significant regulatory” and budgetary actions through the White House and the Office of Management and Budget. If implemented to its full extent, this action will significantly strengthen the authority of the White House by weakening the political autonomy of these independent agencies. As an assertion of the President’s inherent powers under Article II of the U.S. Constitution, it also stands to weaken congressional influence over these independent agencies, both through the appropriations and confirmation processes.

On Friday, June 28, 2024, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council (“Chevron”)[1] in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (No. 22-451) and Relentless v. Dep’t of Commerce (No. 22–1219)[2] (the two cases collectively referred to as “Loper Bright”), bringing an official end to the decades-old and eponymously named “Chevron deference” doctrine. Not content to stop there, the Court returned fresh to work Monday, July 1, to, in Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (No. 22-451)[3] (“Corner Post”), effectively extend the limitations period to challenge final agency actions under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).

The Annual Spring Meeting of the ABA Section of Antitrust Law is the world's largest meeting of competition and consumer protection professionals. The Spring Meeting brings together all segments of the global competition and consumer protection community - enforcement officials, private attorneys, in-house corporate counsel, academics, judges, economists, and business people - to share knowledge about all aspects of competition and consumer protection law.

Please join us online for this half day program that will analyze and assess FTC and DOJ merger enforcement in the past year and then look forward to what implications their policy priorities may have for tech (and beyond). The program, hosted by Professor William E. Kovacic, Director, Competition Law Center, George Washington University Law School, and Professor Andrew I. Gavil, Senior of Counsel, Crowell & Moring, will consist of two panels and a fireside chat. More details are below. 

In response to the digital revolution and the increasing impact technology has on business, Competition Authorities on both sides of the Atlantic are stepping up merger control enforcement. They are revising current policies, advocating for more aggressive use of existing rules to their full potential effect, and calling for new laws and regulations where they see the need. What does this mean for companies engaging in transactions in the digital marketplace and other industries? Is it becoming harder to predict if a deal will be subject to merger control? Are some deals more likely to receive enhanced scrutiny than others? And, what are the broader implications for all sectors when Competition Authorities push the boundaries on traditional theories of harm and remedies, and prohibitions become more commonplace?    

What factors have led antitrust enforcers and legislators to express concerns about the state of merger enforcement, particularly in digital markets? Are the horizontal and vertical merger guidelines equipped to handle antitrust issues in today’s economy? How have prior transactions by the big tech companies ignited the next wave of potential merger guidelines revisions, and which specific concerns are likely to be addressed? And what should companies across all industries expect if and when the merger guidelines are updated?