Insights

On March 12, 2025, the Government of Canada announced plans to launch the Canadian Program for Cyber Security Certification (CPCSC). CPCSC is a cybersecurity compliance verification program that aims to protect sensitive unclassified government information handled by Canadian government contractors and subcontractors within Canada’s defense sector. Canada will roll out CPCSC to contractors in four phases, with the first phase launching this month.

On March 24, 2025, the Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) unveiled “FedRAMP 20x,” a proposal to make FedRAMP more efficient by automating FedRAMP security assessments and continuous monitoring, simplifying required technical controls, and leaning on industry to provide tooling and solutions to support automation. 

On February 20, 2025, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced the formation of the Cyber and Emerging Technologies Unit, known as “CETU,” which will replace the Crypto Assets and Cyber Unit (“CACU”).

Amidst a flurry of executive cost-cutting, the Department of Defense’s (DoD) Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification program—often known just as “CMMC”— appears to be defying the odds and only picking up steam. Marking the first CMMC developments under the new administration, the DoD has published guidance that previews what to expect once CMMC is finalized. These developments suggest that the current administration intends to pick up where it left off, having first introduced the CMMC program during President Trump’s first term.

On January 15, 2025, the FAR Council released a proposed rule (FAR CUI Rule) that would amend the FAR to implement federal government-wide Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) cybersecurity, training, and incident reporting requirements for government contractors and subcontractors.  The rule’s key cybersecurity requirements closely mirror the Department of Defense’s Cyber Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) program (for example, compliance with National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-171, Revision 2), but broaden the scope to include contractors and subcontractors working across all federal agencies.  The Rule is intended to standardize the handling of CUI by federal government contractors and subcontractors in accordance with Executive Order 13556, including by:

On November 15, 2024, the Department of Defense (DoD) issued a Proposed Rule implementing Section 1655 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 (P.L. 115-232), over six years after Congress enacted the requirement. 

On October 11, 2024, the Department of Defense (DoD) released a final rule (the “Final Program Rule”) formalizing the requirements, assessment processes, and related governance for its Cyber Maturity Model Certification Program (CMMC).[1] 

On August 15, 2024, the Department of Defense (“DoD”) released the long-awaited proposed rule (“August 2024 Proposed Rule”), updating Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (“DFARS”) Clause 252.204-7021 (the “7021 Clause”), which, when final, will initiate the phased implementation of Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification 2.0 (“CMMC”) requirements into DoD contracts.  The Clause will require every defense contractor that handles Federal Contract Information (“FCI”) or Controlled Unclassified Information (“CUI”) to assess and certify compliance with select CMMC security requirements.  The August 2024 Proposed Rule introduces several distinct changes to the 7021 Clause published by DoD in January 2023, including:

On July 25, 2024 the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued Memorandum M-24-15, Modernizing the Federal Risk Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) (the Memo).  The Memo proposes substantial updates to FedRAMP, replacing the December 2011 memorandum (2011 Memo) that established FedRAMP as the government-wide security and risk assessments program for cloud services providers (CSPs) supporting federal government operations.

On Thursday, July 18, 2024, Judge Paul Engelmayer, U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of New York, dismissed the bulk of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) landmark civil securities law claims against SolarWinds and its Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) Timothy Brown.  The Court dismissed all allegations based on SolarWinds’ public disclosures made after SolarWinds became a victim of the well-publicized SUNBURST cybersecurity attack, and also dismissed the SEC’s claims relating to SolarWinds’ internal accounting controls and disclosure controls and procedures.  However, the Court declined to dismiss claims of securities fraud against SolarWinds and its CISO based on SolarWinds’ pre-SUNBURST disclosures, finding that the SEC had properly pleaded that the company’s publicly-posted “Security Statement” was materially false and misleading. 

On June 17, 2024, the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced a $11.3 million False Claims Act (FCA) settlement that touches on two key enforcement priorities:  the DOJ’s Civil Cyber-Fraud Initiative and pandemic-related fraud.  This settlement, the largest under the Civil Cyber-Fraud Initiative to date, resolved allegations that Guidehouse Inc. (Guidehouse) and its subcontractor, Nan McKay and Associates (Nan McKay), violated the FCA because they failed to conduct pre‑production cybersecurity testing on New York State’s Emergency Rental Assistance Program (ERAP) technology product before public launch, and that Guidehouse used an unapproved third-party data cloud software program to store personally identifiable information (PII).

On May 14, 2024, the National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST) published the final versions of Special Publication (SP) 800-171 Revision 3, Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Systems and Organizations and its companion assessment guide, NIST SP 800-171A, Revision 3 (collectively, “Rev. 3 Final Version”).  While the Department of Defense (DoD) is not requiring contractors who handle Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) to implement Rev. 3 for now, it is expected that DoD will eventually incorporate Rev. 3 into both DFARS 252.204-7012,  Safeguarding Covered Defense Information and Cyber Incident Reporting (DFARS 7012) as well as the forthcoming Cyber Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) program. 

On May 2, 2024, the Department of Defense (DoD) issued a class deviation to DFARS 252.204-7012,  Safeguarding Covered Defense Information and Cyber Incident Reporting (DFARS 7012), specifying that contractors subject to the clause must comply with NIST SP 800-171, Revision 2.  The deviation (labeled Deviation 2024-O0013) will delay the incorporation of NIST SP 800-171, Revision 3—which is set to be finalized in the next few weeks—into DFARS 7012.

On March 11, 2024, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) published an updated Secure Software Development Attestation Form, meaning that producers of software and providers of products containing software used by the federal government may be required to submit their attestations in the very near future. The Attestation Form, first published in April 2023, is a key cog in CISA’s implementation of software supply chain security requirements in accordance with Executive Order 14028, Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity and OMB Memoranda M-22-18 and M-23-16.

On January 29, 2024, the Department of Commerce released a proposed rule:  Taking Additional Steps To Address the National Emergency With Respect to Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities, which solicits comments regarding a proposed  new set of regulations that would introduce significant new requirements for U.S.-based Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) providers.  The proposed rule implements requirements from the January 2021 Executive Order Taking Additional Steps To Address the National Emergency With Respect to Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities and part of the October 2023 Executive Order Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence.  If Commerce implements the regulations as proposed, IaaS providers would be required to create a Customer Identification Program (CIP), ensure any foreign resellers maintain a CIP, track all customer identities, verify the identities of foreign customers, and report certain transactions implicating large AI models that could be used for malicious cyber-enabled activities.  The Department is soliciting comments on all aspects of the proposed rule by April 29, 2024.

The Department of Defense (DoD) recently published a memorandum clarifying what it means for a cloud service provider (CSP) to be Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) Moderate baseline “equivalent” and meet incident reporting requirements under Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) Clause 252.204-7012, Safeguarding Covered Defense Information and Cyber Incident Reporting (DFARS 7012). The memorandum states, in order to be considered FedRAMP equivalent going forward, CSPs must (1) be FedRAMP Moderate/High-Authorized, or (2) secure a third-party assessment confirming their compliance with all FedRAMP Moderate baseline security controls.

On December 26, 2023, the Department of Defense (DoD) released the highly anticipated proposed rule for the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification Program (CMMC), a cybersecurity regulatory program that will likely impact most of the government contractor community. Every contractor who handles sensitive data such as Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) or Federal Contract Information (FCI) during DoD contract performance will be covered by this regulation. While the CMMC program builds upon the security requirements included in Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) clause 252.204-7012, CMMC will bring greater scrutiny to contractors’ cybersecurity compliance and potentially greater consequences for failure to comply in the era of the Department of Justice’s Civil Cyber Fraud Initiative and False Claims Act litigation. If finalized as proposed, the rule will significantly impact the CMMC regime, notably by requiring senior company officials to complete an affirmation for every CMMC level self-assessed or certified, thus increasing legal compliance risks.

Public companies now have a pathway to request a delay in their cybersecurity incident disclosure to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). On December 6, 2023, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) Cyber Division published the “Cyber Victim Requests to Delay Securities and Exchange Commission Public Disclosure Policy Notice” (the “Policy Notice”) in response to the SEC’s finalized disclosure rules (the “Final Rules”). Published on July 26, 2023, the Final Rules established guidelines around cybersecurity risk management, strategy, governance, and incidents for public companies subject to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Among several requirements under the Final Rules, companies are required to disclose cybersecurity incidents within four days of a materiality determination by filing an SEC Form 8-K.

On November 9, 2023, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) released the Final Public Draft (“FPD”) of Special Publication (“SP”) 800-171 Revision (“Rev.”) 3, “Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Systems and Organizations” and the Initial Public Draft of NIST SP 800-171A Rev 3, “Assessing Security Requirements for Controlled Unclassified Information.”  The FPD of SP 800-171 Rev. 3 condenses several control requirements from the initial public draft while adding new requirements under existing controls.  The initial draft of SP 800-171A now aligns with SP 800-171 Rev. 3 and includes more detailed assessment procedures than its predecessor.  Changes in both documents forecast the evolving compliance requirements for organizations required to safeguard Controlled Unclassified Information (“CUI”).

On October 30, 2023, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) filed a civil lawsuit charging SolarWinds Corporation (“SolarWinds” or the “Company”) and its chief information security officer, Timothy G. Brown (“Brown”), with securities fraud, internal controls failures, misleading investors about cyber risk, and disclosure controls failures, among other violations.  The SEC’s claims arise from allegedly known cybersecurity risks and vulnerabilities at SolarWinds associated with the SUNBURST cyberattack that occurred between 2018 and 2021.