1. Home
  2. |Insights
  3. |When Determining Task Order Value for GAO Protest Jurisdiction, Look to What the Task Order Says, Not What the Agency May Do

When Determining Task Order Value for GAO Protest Jurisdiction, Look to What the Task Order Says, Not What the Agency May Do

What You Need to Know

  • Key takeaway #1

    Although a number of factors may inform the “value” of a task order—e.g., the awarded amount, the evaluated amount, the amount an agency is obligated to pay—for purposes of assessing GAO’s protest jurisdiction, keep it simple.  Look to the face value of the task order absent extenuating circumstances counseling otherwise.

  • Key takeaway #2

    Companies considering competing in task- and delivery-order procurements should be aware of the thresholds for GAO’s protest jurisdiction over task orders ($25 million for DOD task orders, $10 million for civilian task orders) and price their proposals accordingly.  A bid under the relevant thresholds may not help you win an award, but it can provide some protection from a protest if you do.

Client Alert | 2 min read | 01.16.24

Subject to limited exceptions, GAO’s bid protest jurisdiction over Department of Defense (DoD) awards of task orders under multiple-award contracts is limited to those “valued in excess” of $25 million.  While that seems straightforward enough, GAO’s recent decision in ELS, Inc., B‑421989, B‑421989.2, Dec. 21, 2023, highlights the complexities that can arise in calculating a task order’s value.

ELS involved a Navy procurement for administrative and engineering support services.  The solicitation provided for a cost-plus-fixed-fee task order and contained multiple cost-reimbursable contract line items.  Relevant here, the task order was subject to FAR clause 52.232-20, Limitation of Cost, pursuant to which the government is not obligated to reimburse a contractor for costs incurred in excess of the task order’s estimated cost.  ELS protested the Navy’s award of the task order to GreenXT.  The awarded task order reflected GreenXT’s proposed cost of $24,848,774, which was just below GAO’s $25 million jurisdictional threshold.  But the Navy determined GreenXT’s total evaluated cost—i.e., the total amount the Navy expected to pay—to be $25,116,561, which was above the GAO threshold. 

The Navy moved to dismiss ELS’ protest, arguing that the relevant number for purposes of GAO’s protest jurisdiction was the actual value of the awarded task order and here, that value, $24.8 million, was below the $25 million threshold.  ELS conversely argued the salient consideration was the total amount the Navy itself had determined it would pay GreenXT: $25.1 million.

GAO dismissed ELS’ protest for lack of jurisdiction.  In so doing, GAO held the general rule for purposes of determining task order value is, simply enough, the stated value of the awarded task order, because the primary focus is on the contractual agreement between the parties, not what the awardee might ultimately be paid for contract performance.  And here, although the task order included cost-reimbursable line items that pushed the evaluated cost above the jurisdictional threshold, GAO explained that the inclusion of FAR clause 52.232-20 absolved the government of liability for any costs incurred in excess of the task order’s awarded value.  GAO noted that only in rare instances, such as procurements involving unconventional compensation methods or unusual evaluation techniques, is departure from the general rule appropriate, and those circumstances were not present in ELS.

We would like to thank Cherie J. Owen, Consultant, for her contribution to this alert.

Contacts

Insights

Client Alert | 3 min read | 06.12.26

DOJ Guidance Backs Away From Disparate Impact Liability

On June 9, 2026, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a formal opinion concluding that the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission’s (EEOC) existing interpretations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) disparate-impact liability, including the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (UGESP), are unconstitutional. According to the opinion, EEOC’s prior interpretations contemplate liability based on disproportionately adverse effects alone, without regard to an employer’s likely intent, rather than treating disparate impact as an evidentiary mechanism to “smoke out” intentional discrimination. DOJ found that this approach functions as a “qualified racial-proportionality mandate” that places “a racial thumb on the scales, often requiring employers to evaluate the racial outcomes of their policies, and to make decisions based on (because of) those racial outcomes.” The opinion fulfills one mandate of Executive Order 14281, which rejected disparate-impact liability insofar as it “creates a near insurmountable presumption that unlawful discrimination exists wherever there are any differences in outcomes among different [demographic groups].”...

View All Insights