The FY 2025 National Defense Authorization Act: Key Provisions Government Contractors Should Know

On December 23, 2024, the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2025 (FY 2025 NDAA) (P.L. 118-159) was signed into law.  The final FY 2025 NDAA takes a narrower approach to acquisition policy and supply chain changes than watchers expected, but it still makes some consequential changes for contractors.  Read on as Crowell & Moring’s Government Contracts group discusses the FY 2025 NDAA’s new supply chain restrictions and requirements, changes to bid protest jurisdiction, cybersecurity requirements, and more.

I.  Acquisition Policy Matters

Changes to Acquisition Pathways

Section 802 amends 10 U.S.C. § 3322 to allow only one Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) Lot to be procured using fixed-price type options on a contract for the development of a major system.  Despite a waiver provision (based on a Department of Defense (DoD) determination of its best interests), this change will likely limit the use of fixed-price LRIP options on major systems development contracts.  

Sections 804 and 805 establish new acquisition authorities with expedited contracting pathways.  Section 804 establishes 10 U.S.C. § 3602, a new middle-tier acquisition authority for rapid prototyping and rapid fielding for certain programs or projects.  This authority will permit DoD to conduct expedited acquisitions within the rapid prototyping pathway as long as the operational capability is fielded within a five-year period and meets other requirements that DoD must establish under Section 804.  Similarly, Section 805 establishes acquisition pathways for applications and embedded systems.  Once DoD establishes these acquisition pathways, each will provide an expedited process for acquisition. 

Contract Formation and Administration

Section 803 amends 10 U.S.C. § 3372(b) to clarify that a DoD Contracting Officer’s unilateral definitization is a final decision that may be appealed to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals or the United States Court of Federal Claims.

Section 824 amends Section 822 of the FY 2023 NDAA, which permitted contractors and subcontractors impacted by inflation to file claims for relief under Public Law 85-804 once DoD issued the relevant regulation.  This provision clarifies that DoD may use appropriated funds to pay for claims for relief for contractors and subcontractors impacted by inflation, and it extends the authority for such relief to December 31, 2025.

Section 881 requires an amendment to FAR 9.503 to require all requests for an organizational conflict of interest (OCI) waiver to include a written justification, and to prohibit delegation of OCI waiver authority below the level of the deputy agency head. 

Commercial Determinations

Section 814 will make it more difficult for an individual DoD Contracting Officer to assert that a product or service is not commercial, requiring DoD Contracting Officers to rely on a prior acquisition of a product or service using commercial acquisition procedures as a commercial product or commercial service determination, including a product without a part number or a with a different part number but the same functionality, and further including such products or services with minor modifications.  If the Contracting Officer seeks to disregard that commerciality determination, the Contracting Officer must submit a written determination explaining why the product or service is not commercial, and then Section 814 vests the commerciality decision with the senior procurement executive of the military department.  Section 814’s changes also apply to subcontractors if the Department of Defense Contracting Officer previously approved the commerciality at that level. 

Cost and Price Data for Certain Commercial Contracts

Two sections meant to further congressional efforts to simplify DoD contracting with nontraditional defense contractors may be of interest to those contractors, as well as primes and higher-tier subcontractors doing business with nontraditional defense contractors.  Nontraditional defense contractors, as defined in 10 U.S.C. § 3014, are entities that are not currently performing and have not in the last year performed any DoD contract or subcontract that is subject to full Cost Accounting Standards coverage.  First, Section 815 enacts a new exemption from the requirement to submit certified cost and pricing data for nontraditional defense contractors with respect to certain subcontracts.  For subcontracts not expected to exceed $5 million, instead of certified cost or pricing data, nontraditional defense contractors may submit prices paid for the same goods and services that the offeror will provide under the subcontract, and such prices will suffice if a DoD contracting officer “determines that the prices submitted . . . are fair and reasonable based on supported cost or pricing data within the last 12 months.”

Similarly, Section 864 establishes a pilot program, through September 30, 2029, by which DoD contracting officers may use “alternative capability-based analysis” to determine price reasonableness for commercial products or services offered by nontraditional defense contractors.  When conducting such analyses, the contracting officer may consider the value to the government of the commercial product or service, including the commercial product or service’s fitness for the particular purpose offered, the technical expertise and non-federal resources required to develop the commercial product or service, the cost avoidance or increased capacity due to the commercial product or service, and input from the anticipated users, as well as the nontraditional defense contractor’s business model or financial projections. 

Intellectual Property and Data Rights

Congress considered—and rejected—several NDAA provisions and amendments related to the tension between contractors’ rights in technical data and DoD’s need for competition and interoperability.  Ultimately, the enacted FY 2025 NDAA shows Congress’s desire to ensure interoperability and enhanced competition through modular open system approaches, and a new permission for DoD to reverse engineer or re-engineer items in certain circumstances.

Section 819 amends a requirement in the FY 2017 NDAA, as amended by the FY 2021 NDAA, which requires defense acquisition programs to be designed with a modular open system approach, to the extent practicable, to increase competition, and allow for incremental development and interoperability.  By Section 819, Congress requires DoD to make publicly available any standards for implementing modular open system approaches for contracts by December 23, 2025, unless the applicable service acquisition executive and Secretary of Defense approve a request not to disclose.

Section 882 requires DoD to establish a streamlined procedure for production of items DoD could produce through reverse engineering or re-engineering, when DoD lacks technical data or rights in technical data to manufacture the item, and

• DoD requires the item for point-of-use manufacturing or in a contested logistics environment,
• the manufacturer will not meet the schedule to maintain weapon system readiness or responsiveness, or
• the item can only be acquired via sole-source contract and the service acquisition executive determines that reverse engineering or re-engineering the item is beneficial to sustain training or operations with respect to that item.

To carry out this mandate, DoD must also identify items for which technical data is not available, or for which DoD’s rights in the technical data do not permit manufacturing of the item. 

Other Transactions

Section 816 amends the approval requirements for prototype other transactions by reducing approval authorities to the following: (1) head of contracting activity, for transactions in excess of $100 million but not in excess of $500 million; and (2) senior procurement executive, or the director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Defense Innovation Unit, or the Missile Defense Agency, for transactions in excess of $500 million.

Section 817 defines “follow-on production contracts or transactions” and clarifies that sole-source follow-on production contracts or transactions that are awarded after successful completion of a prototype project under an other transaction may be awarded as one or more separate awards.

Section 888 requires DoD to establish a process to track the number and value of awards to small businesses and nontraditional defense contractors performing on transactions using other transaction authority. 

Protests

Section 885 is the latest version of Congress’s long-running attempt to make protesters pay for unsuccessful GAO protests.  The most important protest-related change for contractors in the FY 2025 NDAA is a provision increasing the threshold for GAO protests of task orders under DoD indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts from $25,000,000 to $35,000,000, foreclosing protest of a large swath of DoD task orders.

The increase in GAO’s task order protest threshold appears to be part of a compromise to walk back a House-passed provision (Section 872) that would have required a pilot program to study the effectiveness of requiring protesters to “reimburse” DoD for “costs incurred in processing” protests deemed unsuccessful.  Instead, Section 885 requires GAO and DoD to develop a proposal to the congressional defense committees that includes:

• “enhanced pleading standards” for GAO protests prior to production of the Agency Report;
• a determination of the average costs to GAO and DoD for a protest “based on the value of the contract” under protest and the “costs of the lost profit rates” of the awardee, based on the awardee’s projected earnings if contract performance would have begun but for the stay of performance triggered by the protest; and
• a process for unsuccessful protesters to pay the government and the contract awardee at those average cost and lost profit rates, respectively.

The proposal must be submitted to congressional defense committees within 180 days of enactment, by June 21, 2025, signaling that Congress wants the recommendations before finalizing next year’s NDAA.

II. Domestic Preferences and Critical Materials

Congress continued its focus on domestic sourcing, with new domestic sourcing goals for strategic and critical materials derived from recycled or reused minerals and metals (Section 847), domestic sourcing requirements for stainless steel flatware and dinnerware (Section 842) and certain diesel engines used on ships (Section 846), and a curtailment of the specialty metals exception to those produced by qualifying countries (i.e., those with which the U.S. has a reciprocal defense procurement relationship) (Section 845).  In addition, Section 848 requires DoD to develop and maintain a list of all domestic nonavailability determinations, submit the list to Congress, and develop a plan for sharing the list with industry partners, which dovetails with the Biden Administration’s Executive Order on Ensuring the Future Is Made in All of America by All of America’s Workers, which among other things required the FAR Council to document all non-availability waivers.

Despite Congress’s focus on domestic sourcing, Section 843 contains a “technical edit” by which Congress purportedly clarified that inability to obtain strategic materials at a “reasonable price” is a valid basis to waive the requirement to procure domestically sourced strategic and critical material.  This is a significant relaxation of the current requirement for domestic production of strategic and critical materials absent a finding that there is no available domestic source.

III. National Security-Related Matters

Although Congress was expected to include a litany of bills targeting national security risks, including those posed by the government of the Peoples Republic of China and specific Chinese companies, the FY 2025 NDAA includes fewer of such provisions than have been included in recent years.  The provisions included evince Congress’s continued interest in de-coupling at least certain sectors of the U.S. economy from China. 

Supply Chain Prohibitions on Specific Technologies

Section 162 directs DoD to identify risks in the supply chain for small unmanned aerial systems (“sUAS”) and increase sUAS resiliency by developing a domestic and allied supply chain of sUAS component parts.  As part of these measures, DoD must disassemble a sUAS from a covered foreign country, assess the risk of critical component parts, and develop a supply chain risk framework.

Section 165 prohibits DoD from procuring LiDAR directly, or as part of a system that uses LiDAR, if (1) the LiDAR is manufactured by a “covered LiDAR company,” and (2) either the manufacturing, software design, or network connectivity or data storage for that LiDAR occurs in, or is performed by an entity domiciled in, a “covered foreign country,” defined as the PRC, Iran, North Korea, and Russia.  The provision defines “covered LiDAR company” as including Hesai and its subsidiaries or affiliates, entities on the Consolidated Screening List or the 1260H list, and entities domiciled in, or subject to unmitigated foreign control or influence (“FOCI”) concerns with, a covered foreign country.

Technology Protection

Section 215 requires the Secretary of Defense to develop and incorporate technology protection features in major systems to increase ally and partner military capabilities or improve coalition interoperability.  Technology protection features are technical modifications necessary to protect critical program information, including anti-tamper technology and other systems engineering activities intended to prevent or delay exploitation of critical technologies.  The section also requires that contracts for the design or development of exportability features of such systems include a cost-sharing provision that requires the contractor to bear half the cost of such activities.

China-Related Provisions

Section 839 makes three major expansions to the scope of FY 2022 NDAA Section 855, as implemented by DFARS 252.225-7057 and 252.225-7058, which require contractors to disclose, at offer and annually thereafter, their personnel (including affiliate personnel) who will work in the People’s Republic of China on that DoD contract valued at $5 million or more.  These disclosure obligations applied to “covered contracts,” previously defined as non-commercial DoD contracts valued over $5 million.  Under Section 839, Congress made the following changes:

• Expanded the disclosure requirement to cover not just contractor employees who perform work in China, but also contractor and affiliate employees who perform work “for, or are subject to the laws or control of” the People’s Republic of China, suggesting that the provision could apply to employees outside of China who are nevertheless performing work for China or are subject to Chinese laws or control.
• Revised the definition of “covered contract” to now include any “contract or subcontract for, or including, any information and communications technology,” with the express inclusion of contracts for commercial products or services.
• Expanded the required disclosures for contractors providing computer software, requiring them to disclose whether they are required to disclose any “cybersecurity vulnerabilities” or “software vulnerabilities” to any Chinese government entity, describe any disclosure process, and provide for disclosure of the same “cybersecurity vulnerabilities” or “software vulnerabilities” to the United States.

Together, the expanded requirements in Section 839 have the potential to capture some of contractors’ commercial relationships including affiliate employees in China, and may necessitate consideration of operating procedures for commercial work in China.  Further, without the applicability threshold and commercial exemption, the disclosure obligation will now apply more broadly, including to contractors and subcontractors who provide even lower-dollar-value commercial products and services.  Section 839 will become effective after rulemaking, which is required within 180 days of enactment, i.e., by June 21, 2025.

Section 851 prohibits DoD from entering into contracts with any company (or the company’s parent or subsidiary) that has a contract with a “covered entity,” that is, an entity that engages in “lobbying activities” (as defined under the Lobbying Disclosure Act) for an entity listed per section 1260H of the FY 2021 NDAA, which required DoD to create and continuously maintain a list of “Chinese military companies” operating in the United States (the 1260H List).  The prohibition takes effect June 30, 2026.  The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the FY 2025 NDAA makes clear that Section 851 is yet another measure to give teeth to what had effectively been a “name-and-shame” list, following two other prohibitions associated with the 1260H List: one on DoD procuring end products and services from 1260H Listed entities (FY 2024 NDAA Section 805) and another one on DoD contracting with consulting firms that have contracts for work with certain foreign government and commercial customers, including 1260H Listed companies (FY 2024 NDAA Section 812).  To that end, the Joint Explanatory Statement requires GAO to develop a report of the national security risks posed by consulting firms who simultaneously contract with DoD and the Chinese government or its proxies or affiliates, including DoD’s measures to restrict and enforce contractual terms related to conflicts of interest.

Section 853 prohibits DoD from entering into or renewing a contract for “covered semiconductor products and services”—that is, semiconductors, and the equipment to manufacture and tools to design semiconductors—with any entity that “knowingly provides covered semiconductor products or services: to Huawei” and its affiliates or subsidiaries.  This prohibition must take effect within 270 days of enactment, by September 19, 2025.  To implement the prohibition, Section 853 directs DoD to establish and implement a process by which an offeror that will provide “covered semiconductor products and services” to DoD will certify that it is not providing such services to Huawei and, therefore, is not subject to the prohibition.  The Secretary of Defense may waive the prohibition if the Secretary determines that the covered semiconductor products and services are only available from an entity subject to the prohibition and are required for DoD’s “national security systems or priority missions[.]”

Section 1346 amends Section 1260H of the FY 2021 NDAA by expanding the definitions of certain terms, and providing for more transparency with 1260H List designations.  The provision expands the definition of “Chinese military company” to include entities connected to a wider range of actors and engaging in certain activities including research partnerships with certain Chinese institutions.  It also expands the definition of “operating directly or indirectly in the United States” to include entities without a physical presence in the United States.  Likely in response to recent litigation challenging the validity of certain 1260H List designations, Section 1346 requires DoD to provide written justifications for additions to or removals from the 1260H List.  Under the provision, DoD must also provide a version of the list translated into Mandarin.  Finally, signaling ongoing congressional interest in legislative restrictions on entities on the 1260H List, Section 1346 also requires DoD to submit an annual report regarding the presence of each listed entity in the U.S. defense industrial base and efforts to enforce procurement restrictions on each entity.

Battery Reporting Requirements

The House-passed and Senate committee-reported versions of the NDAA each included provisions that would have required DoD to procure certain types of batteries that are sourced, refined, and produced in the U.S., Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, or Japan, starting at 10% in 2026 and increasing to 95% by 2029.  Despite the clear alignment on domestic and allied sourcing of batteries, Section 883 contains no sourcing preference, or procurement mandate.  Instead, the compromise provision requires DoD to coordinate a DoD-wide approach to establish a battery strategy to further leverage the advancements of domestic and allied commercial industries.  As the domestic and allied battery industry continues to evolve, contractors should expect renewed congressional interest in domestic preference for batteries.

Coordination with Private Companies

Section 1081 amends the FY 2023 NDAA by requiring (rather than permitting) DoD to convene private companies to discuss market trends and opportunities abroad related to “covered transactions,” defined as those which the Secretary determines would “likely involve an entity affiliated with a strategic competitor unless an alternative transaction were to occur.”   

Section 1092 requires DoD to establish a forum, chaired by the Director of the Office of Strategic Capital, to convene domestic and international financiers, capital providers, investors, entrepreneurs, innovators, business persons, representatives from across the private sector, relevant U.S. Government officers, and government and private entities of partner nations to allow for the exchange of information relating to transactions (or potential transactions) to integrate efforts supporting U.S. national security interests.  DoD must issue guidance on the establishment and operation of the forum no later than 180 days after the enactment of the NDAA, by June 21, 2025.

Sections 5601 through 5603 require the General Services Administration (GSA) to carry out a government-wide study examining options to assist agencies in producing security assessment processes before entering a lease or novation agreement for space that is adjacent to “high-security leased space”—defined as space leased by a federal lessee that is occupied by federal employees for nonmilitary activities, with a facility security level of III, IV, or V.  The study must evaluate how to produce a security assessment process to evaluate the threat level of leasing the adjacent space including through site visits and interviews, and it may include a process for collecting and using information on immediate, highest-level, or beneficial owners of potential lessees.  Within 90 days of NDAA enactment, by March 24, 2025, GSA must convene a working group to assist in carrying out the study, and within two years of the NDAA’s enactment, by December 23, 2026, publish a report on the results of the study.  These provisions explicitly state that information collected in the study will not be available to the public and may not be used for law enforcement purposes.

IV. Industrial Base and Small Business Matters

In keeping with Congress’s theme of adopting a narrower version of the NDAA, the final NDAA omitted provisions from the House-passed NDAA that would have required DoD to establish goals for contracting with small and veteran-owned small business concerns and to provide training to DoD contracting personnel on increasing small business contracting.

Section 863 further extends the DoD pilot program for Streamlining Awards for Innovative Technology Projects to small business contractors and nontraditional defense contractors from October 1, 2024, as set in the FY 2022 NDAA, until October 1, 2029.

Section 865 requires DoD to establish a pilot program to expedite the qualification of key technologies critical to weapons programs, including energetic materials, rocket motors, unmanned systems, space systems, electrical components, castings and forgings, and additive or advanced manufacturing techniques.  This pilot program must also address known DoD supply chain deficiencies, although Congress does not specify how DoD must do so. 

Section 874 requires DoD to create a pilot program to increase access to shared classified commercial infrastructure and simplify the process for small businesses and higher education institutions to apply for and maintain facility clearances to ultimately increase participation in classified contracts by small businesses and higher education institutions.  Under the pilot program, DoD must update or prescribe policies and regulations governing how shared commercial classified infrastructure may obtain facility sponsorship, authorization, and accreditations required to access relevant DoD secure IT networks, and modernize, streamline, and accelerate DoD’s approval process for joint use agreements that facilitate access to shared classified commercial infrastructure by small business and higher education institution contractors.  The pilot program will expire on September 30, 2030.

V. Cyber-Related Matters

The cybersecurity and AI provisions in the FY 2025 NDAA are notable not only for what they include but also for what Congress omitted.  Both the House-passed and Senate committee-reported versions of the NDAA proposed targeted cyber provisions that were not carried forward into the final compromise NDAA.  In addition, several measures that sought to curtail China through cybersecurity and by cracking down on its use of AI were up for inclusion in the final compromise NDAA but were ultimately omitted.

Cloud Computing Matters

Congress focused several provisions on DoD’s Joint Warfighting Cloud Capability multi-vendor contract vehicle and successor contracts.  Section 1505 is one such provision, requiring DoD to submit periodic reports to the congressional defense committees about contracts awarded under DoD’s Joint Warfighting Cloud Capability (JWCC) multi-vendor contract vehicle, but this section omits the potentially intrusive needs-forecasting that the House-passed version of the provision contemplated.  Those reports must include information about all JWCC contracts, a list of cloud capabilities and services that DoD acquires outside of JWCC, and information sufficient to explain where DoD cloud environments are being used and costs incurred by the DoD on non-JWCC cloud contracts.  The first report must be submitted no later than October 15, 2025, with new reports every six months thereafter.  

In addition, Section 1514 orders DoD to develop a strategy for the management and cybersecurity of DoD multi-cloud environments (i.e. environments that leverage cloud computing services from more than one cloud service provider), including the JWCC contract.  Key requirements DoD must incorporate into the multi-cloud strategy include:

• aligning the multi-cloud strategy with DoD’s Zero Trust Strategy;
• providing visibility and interoperability across all DoD multi-cloud environments;
• improving the identification and resolution of security concerns for DoD cloud environments;
• assessing means to increase the adoption of AI into DoD multi-cloud environments; and
• identifying opportunities to streamline the cloud service provider certification process.

DoD must develop the multi-cloud strategy no later than 180 days after the NDAA’s enactment, by June 21, 2025, and submit the strategy and an accompanying briefing to the congressional defense committees no later than 240 days after the NDAA’s enactment, by August 20, 2025.

Section 1522 directs DoD to update its Authorization to Operate (ATO) processes for cloud capabilities.  Specifically, DoD must develop a policy requiring DoD officials to accept security analysis and artifacts of a cloud capability that has already been authorized by another DoD official or component.  The policy must also provide for standardization of accreditation documentation and other measures to enhance reciprocity between DoD components’ respective ATO processes, including Federal Risk and Authorization Management (FedRAMP) ATOs.  This Section’s intent is to allow DoD to more rapidly adopt and use cloud capabilities at corresponding classification levels without additional, redundant authorizations or reviews.  DoD must implement this policy no later than 180 days following the NDAA’s enactment, by June 21, 2025.

Section 1545 fences 5% of funds authorized for the JWCC contract until DoD provides congressional defense committees with a plan to transition away from the JWCC contract, including details about how DoD will minimize or cease development on the current JWCC contract and a plan, including timelines, for transition to successor contracts.

Mobile and Wearable Devices

Legislation is still catching up with technology.  Congress enacted provisions related to wearable technology and mobile devices.

Section 1513 requires the DoD Chief Information Officer to issue guidance explaining how DoD’s Zero Trust Strategy applies to Internet of Things hardware, as defined by National Institutes of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800-172, “including human-wearable devices, sensors, and other smart technology used by the United States in military operations.”  This guidance must be issued no later than 180 days after the FY 2025 NDAA’s enactment, by June 21, 2025.

Section 1515 seeks to improve the cybersecurity of DoD mobile devices by requiring DoD to evaluate select mobile device-facing cybersecurity products and services for efficacy, value, and feasibility of scale and integration across the DoD.  The evaluation will assess anonymizing-enabling technologies, network enabled full content inspection, mobile-device case hardware solutions, on-device virtual private networks (VPNs), Protected Domain Name Server infrastructure, extended coverage for mobile device end-point detection, and technology leveraging generative AI aimed at protecting text and email against phishing and SMS phishing (i.e., smishing).  DoD must report to Congress on the evaluation and recommendations for the potential procurement of evaluated products and services no later than 270 days following the NDAA’s enactment, by September 19, 2025. 

Section 1523 requires DoD to update DoD policies for protecting biometric data within 180 days of the NDAA’s enactment, by June 21, 2025.  The policy updates must include standards for encrypting and protecting data on biometric collection devices, a requirement for removing data from collection devices and hard drives before disposing of them, and record-keeping procedures for removal processes.

AI Matters

Section 1087 requires the Secretary of Defense to create a working group to develop and coordinate artificial intelligence (AI) initiatives among U.S. allies and partners (to be determined by the Secretary) no later than 90 days after the NDAA’s enactment, by March 24, 2025.  The working group must develop and coordinate efforts to implement AI initiatives used by governments for defense operations.  Section 1087 contemplates that such efforts will include: comparing tools and practices for AI systems; identifying potential solutions to advance interoperability of AI systems; developing a shared strategy for research, development, test, evaluation, and employment of AI systems; managing data for AI systems; testing and evaluating capabilities of the defense industrial base to incorporate AI systems; and expanding innovation efforts by member countries and sharing best practices for accelerated procurement and adoption of AI technology.

Section 1531 instructs the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USDR&E) to establish the “Artificial Intelligence Human Factors Integration Initiative” to improve the usability of AI systems and their output.  The USDR&E must then work with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and the DoD Chief Digital and AI Officer to develop a plan to consider usability in the evaluation process for AI systems and review commercial toolsets for usability.  Among other mandatory components, the plan must provide for AI usability research meetings and other forums with DoD commercial partners. 

Section 1532 requires that DoD expand its infrastructure to meet the processing requirements of advanced AI and high-performance computing and develop its own advanced AI systems.  To meet the processing requirements of AI systems, DoD is instructed to consider both on-premises and commercial cloud processing solutions and to incorporate readily available commercial or open-source solutions when possible.  Using the infrastructure developed under this section, DoD must also develop its own advanced AI systems for general-purpose military applications.  Section 1532 provides DoD the option to use openly or commercially available training data or DoD-curated datasets, as appropriate, and permits DoD to use openly or commercially available AI systems for development or fine-tuning of the DoD AI systems. 

Section 1534 tasks DoD with determining the advisability and feasibility of creating a Center of Excellence for Artificial Intelligence-Enabled Weapon Systems to support the development and maturation of autonomous weapon systems.  The Center would capture, analyze, and share lessons learned regarding autonomous weapon systems across DoD and facilitate collaboration with foreign partners, industry, academia, and not-for-profit organizations.  The Secretary of Defense is required to determine whether such a center is advisable no later than 180 days following the NDAA’s enactment, by June 21, 2025.